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I.  INTRODUCTION 
If Fourth Amendment scholars agree on anything, they agree that 
Fourth Amendment doctrine currently is arbitrary, unpredictable, and 
unsatisfactory.1  The Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment decisions rely 
on two central assumptions about the original understanding of the 
amendment.  First, the Court and most modern commentators have 
presumed that the Fourth Amendment prefers searches and seizures 
pursuant to a specific warrant.  Second, even where law enforcement 
activities do not require a warrant, the Court has presumed that the 
Fourth Amendment imposes a global reasonableness requirement on all 
searches and seizures.  This reasonableness requirement may mandate 
that police officers act with probable cause, reasonable suspicion, or 
some other form of justification, depending on the circumstances. 
In a series of influential books and law review articles, Professor 
 1. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (guaranteeing “[t]he right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects”). 
  For criticisms of current Fourth Amendment doctrine, see Craig M. Bradley, Two 
Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1468 (1985) (“The fourth 
amendment is the Supreme Court’s tarbaby: a mass of contradictions and obscurities that 
has ensnared the ‘Brethren’ in such a way that every effort to extract themselves only 
finds them more profoundly stuck.”); Erik G. Luna, Sovereignty and Suspicion, 48 DUKE 
L.J. 787, 787–88 (1999) (each new Fourth Amendment doctrine “is more duct tape on 
the Amendment’s frame and a step closer to the junkyard”); Lloyd L. Weinreb, 
Generalities of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 47, 49 (1974) (noting that the 
Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is “a body of doctrine that is unstable and 
unconvincing”). 
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Akhil Amar has advocated a restructuring of Fourth Amendment law, 
based on a very different account of Fourth Amendment history.2  
Professor Amar’s principal disagreement with current doctrine relates to 
the warrant preference rule.  Professor Amar writes that the Fourth 
Amendment did not prefer warrants.  Instead, the amendment was 
enacted to limit the use of warrants.  According to Professor Amar, the 
framers viewed warrants as dangerous because a warrant would provide 
a defense to law enforcement officers in a trespass action.  Rather than 
imposing a warrant preference rule, Professor Amar asserts that the Fourth 
Amendment imposes a global reasonableness requirement on all 
searches and seizures. 
This Article concludes that Professor Amar’s account receives little 
support from historical sources.  Contrary to Professor Amar’s assertion, 
the framers did not believe that all warrants were dangerous.  The 
framers actually intended that law enforcement officers must obtain a 
specific warrant before the officers entered a house.  Nor does the 
historical record support Professor Amar’s claim that the Fourth 
Amendment imposed a global reasonableness requirement on all 
searches and seizures.  For example, the Fourth Amendment was not 
even mentioned in early federal ship seizure cases. 
While the historical record does not support Professor Amar’s 
contentions, the Supreme Court’s traditional combination of a warrant 
preference rule and a reasonableness requirement also receives little 
support from historical sources.  In early America, most searches and 
seizures took place without a warrant.  And the historical record does not 
suggest that these searches were assessed under a general reasonableness 
standard. 
The real Fourth Amendment envisioned by the framers was actually a 
narrow document—much less sweeping in scope than either the 
traditional account or Professor Amar’s understanding of history.  
 2. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 64–77 (1998) [hereinafter AMAR, THE 
BILL OF RIGHTS]; AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: 
FIRST PRINCIPLES 1–45 (1997) [hereinafter AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE]; Akhil Reed Amar, Terry and Fourth Amendment First Principles, 72 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 1097 (1998) [hereinafter Amar, Terry and Fourth Amendment First 
Principles]; Akhil Reed Amar, The Fourth Amendment, Boston, and the Writs of 
Assistance, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 53 (1996) [hereinafter Amar, The Writs of 
Assistance]; Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 
757 (1994) [hereinafter Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles]; Akhil Reed Amar, 
The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1175–81 (1991) [hereinafter 
Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution]. 




Historical sources indicate that the framers were focused on a single, 
narrow problem—physical invasions of houses by government agents.3  
The Fourth Amendment was enacted to address this problem with a 
precise, bright-line rule.  Before entering a house, law enforcement 
officers typically would need to obtain a specific warrant.  But what 
about searches or seizures that did not involve a physical entry into a 
house?  Outside of house searches, the Fourth Amendment was simply 
inapplicable.4
II.  MAINSTREAM FOURTH AMENDMENT DISCOURSE 
Mainstream Fourth Amendment discourse provides both that the 
Fourth Amendment prefers searches pursuant to a warrant, and that the 
amendment imposes a reasonableness requirement on warrantless 
searches.  Professor Amar agrees with the reasonableness requirement, 
but disagrees with the warrant preference rule. 
A.  The Warrant Preference Rule 
Although there is considerable disagreement about Fourth Amendment 
law, mainstream discourse views the Fourth Amendment as endorsing a 
warrant preference rule.  According to this interpretation, the Fourth 
Amendment always prefers searches pursuant to a specific warrant, and 
sometimes mandates such a warrant.5
 3. I have developed some of this historical analysis in earlier articles.  See David 
E. Steinberg, The Original Understanding of Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 56 
FLA. L. REV. 1051 (2004); David E. Steinberg, High School Drug Testing and the 
Original Understanding of the Fourth Amendment, 30 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 263 
(2003). 
 4. My view of the Fourth Amendment today is profoundly different from the 
positions that I expressed in some earlier writings on the amendment.  In those pieces, I 
argued that the warrant requirement should apply to a variety of searches that did not 
involve any physical entry into a residence.  See David E. Steinberg, The Drive Toward 
Warrantless Auto Searches: Suggestions From a Back Seat Driver, 80 B.U. L. REV. 545, 
546 (2000) [hereinafter Steinberg, The Drive Toward Warrantless Auto Searches] 
(asserting that the Supreme Court’s “abandonment of the warrant requirement for 
automobile searches is ill-advised”); David E. Steinberg, Making Sense of Sense-
Enhanced Searches, 74 MINN. L. REV. 563, 613–27 (1990) [hereinafter Steinberg, 
Making Sense of Sense-Enhanced Searches] (suggesting a new approach for applying the 
warrant requirement to sense-enhanced searches, which usually do not involve a physical 
entry into a residence).  My change in thinking has resulted both from my more complete 
understanding of Fourth Amendment history and my profound doubts about the viability 
of current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 
 5. For arguments in support of the warrant preference rule, see William J. 
Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment: Origins and Original Meaning, at civ (1990) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate School) (on file with author) 
(asserting that under the Fourth Amendment, “specific warrants were mandatory and 
were intended to be the conventional method of search and seizure”); Tracey Maclin, 
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The U.S. Supreme Court often has stated this warrant preference rule.  
The Justices have concluded that the Fourth Amendment demonstrates a 
“strong preference for searches conducted pursuant to a warrant.”6 At 
the same time, the Justices have stated that “[w]arrantless searches are 
presumptively unreasonable,” outside of cases involving “a few limited 
exceptions to this general rule.”7
Despite the Court’s formal statement of the warrant preference rule, 
the Justices have dramatically limited any Fourth Amendment warrant 
requirement.  First, the Justices have endorsed a long list of categorical 
exceptions where the so-called warrant requirement does not apply.  And 
even in situations where the Court ordinarily would require a warrant, 
the Justices have recognized fact-specific exceptions to this requirement.  
As a result of these Fourth Amendment exceptions, the warrant 
requirement is itself the exception, and not the rule. 
1.  Categorical Exceptions 
A search or seizure requires a warrant only if government activity 
invades a suspect’s “reasonable expectation of privacy.”8  The Court has 
emphasized that people possess a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
their residences.9  The Court also has held that a person’s  reasonable 
expectation of privacy is violated by the warrantless use of a wiretap,10 
The Complexity of the Fourth Amendment: A Historical Review, 77 B.U. L. REV. 925, 
955 (1997); Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. 
REV. 820, 852–56 (1994) (defending the warrant preference rule); Silas J. Wasserstrom, 
The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 257, 294–98 (1984) 
(same). 
 6. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983); accord United States v. Leon, 468 
U.S. 897, 914 (1984) (discussing the Court’s “strong preference for warrants”). 
 7. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 717 (1984); accord California v. Ciraolo, 
476 U.S. 207, 225 (1986). 
 8. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).  
Subsequent Fourth Amendment decisions have endorsed the Katz formulation.  See, e.g., 
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 211; California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39 (1988); Smith v. 
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979). 
 9. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980) (“It is a ‘basic 
principle of Fourth Amendment law’ that searches and seizures inside a home without a 
warrant are presumptively unreasonable.”); United States v. United States Dist. Court, 
407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972) (“[P]hysical entry of the home is the chief evil against which 
the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed . . . .”). 
 10. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 357–59 (holding that federal agents violated the Fourth 
Amendment by not obtaining a warrant, where the agents used a wiretap to eavesdrop on 
conversations made from a public telephone booth). 




and the warrantless search of a container, such as a footlocker.11
But more often than not, the Court has concluded that law 
enforcement activities do not invade a suspect’s reasonable expectation 
of privacy, and do not require a warrant.12  In one of the most important 
Fourth Amendment exceptions, the Court has held that searches of 
automobiles ordinarily do not require a warrant.13  In approving 
warrantless searches of autos, the Court has emphasized that 
automobiles are inherently mobile, heavily regulated, and that most 
people have only a limited expectation of privacy in their cars.14  Other 
situations where the Court has held that individuals do not possess a 
reasonable expectation of privacy include the use of a pen register to 
record the numbers dialed from a suspect’s phone,15 a search of a 
suspect’s garbage,16 and warrantless surveillance from an airplane or 
helicopter.17  And the Court has held that warrantless searches of open 
fields do not violate the Fourth Amendment, regardless of a defendant’s 
efforts to keep his or her fields private.18
 11. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 8–11 (1977) (holding that federal 
agents violated the Fourth Amendment by engaging in a warrantless search of a  
footlocker located in a train terminal).  However, the Court has upheld the warrantless 
search of containers found in automobiles.  See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 
565, 569–81 (1991) (upholding the warrantless search of a paper bag found in the trunk 
of a car); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 804–25 (1982) (same). 
 12. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 1, at 1475 (“As anyone who has worked in the 
criminal justice system knows, searches conducted pursuant to these exceptions, 
particularly searches incident to arrest, automobile and ‘stop and frisk’ searches, far 
exceed searches performed pursuant to warrants.”).
 13. See, e.g., California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390–95 (1985) (upholding the 
warrantless search of a motor home parked in a public parking lot); Chambers v. 
Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 47–52 (1970) (holding that the warrantless search of an 
automobile did not violate the Fourth Amendment). 
 14. See generally Carney, 471 U.S. at 390–92 (discussing the rationales that 
support warrantless searches of automobiles). 
 15. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744–46 (1979). 
 16. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39–44 (1988) (holding that a 
warrantless search of the defendant’s garbage did not violate the Fourth Amendment). 
 17. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449–52 (1989) (holding that warrantless 
surveillance from a helicopter did not violate the Fourth Amendment); Dow Chem. Co. 
v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 234–39 (1986) (holding that where federal agents used an 
airplane to engage in warrantless surveillance of an industrial compound, the agents did 
not violate the Fourth Amendment); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 212–15 (1986) 
(holding that where police officers used an airplane to engage in warrantless surveillance 
of a suspect’s backyard, the officers’ conduct did not violate the suspect’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy). 
 18. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 176–81 (1984).  A federal district court 
had concluded that Ray Oliver possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
fields, based on Oliver’s locked gate and display of “No Trespassing” signs.  United 
States v. Oliver, 686 F.2d 356, 358 (6th Cir. 1982), aff’d, 466 U.S. 170 (1984) 
(summarizing the district court’s unpublished opinion).  In response, the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that the Fourth Amendment simply does not apply to the open fields.  
Therefore, whether Oliver possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy in his fields 
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The Court’s warrant requirement decisions display a disturbing ad hoc 
quality.  If police officers sitting in a car use a thermal imaging unit to 
measure the heat inside of a residence, the officers must obtain a 
warrant.19  But surveillance of a residential backyard from an airplane 
does not require a warrant.20  The search of a footlocker or luggage 
found in a train terminal requires a warrant.21  But a search of the same 
footlocker inside of a car does not.22
2.  Fact Specific Exceptions 
Even in situations where a search or a seizure ordinarily would require 
a warrant, fact-specific exceptions often will make the warrant requirement 
inapplicable.  For practical purposes, the most important of these exceptions 
is the consent search.  A suspect who consents to a search waives his or 
her Fourth Amendment rights, including any requirement that police 
officers must obtain a warrant.23
Where police officers lawfully arrest a suspect, the search incident to 
arrest doctrine provides another exception to the warrant requirement.  
Ordinarily, police officers cannot lawfully open a container without a 
warrant.24  However, if police officers arrest a suspect, the officers may 
was irrelevant.  Oliver, 466 U.S. at 176–77. 
 19. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33–41 (2001) (where federal agents 
conducted a search by using a thermal imaging unit to determine the amount of heat 
emanating from the suspect’s home, the search was presumptively unreasonable without 
a warrant). 
 20. See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 212–15 (holding that the warrantless aerial 
surveillance of a suspect’s backyard did not violate the Fourth Amendment). 
 21. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 11 (1977) (stating that a person 
who places items in a locked footlocker receives the same Fourth Amendment protection 
as “one who locks the doors of his home against intruders”). 
 22. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 569–81 (1991) (holding that where a 
police officer had probable cause to believe that a paper bag in the trunk of the suspect’s 
auto contained marijuana, the police officer could open the paper bag without first 
obtaining a warrant); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 804–25 (1982) (holding that 
where a police officer had probable cause to believe that an automobile contained 
narcotics, the officers could open a paper bag in the trunk of the car without first 
obtaining a warrant). 
 23. See, e.g., Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181–89 (1990) (holding that if 
police officers reasonably believed that a crime victim had authority to consent to a 
search of the defendant’s residence, the officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment 
when they searched the residence without a warrant); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 
164, 171 (1974) (holding that police officers could search a suspect’s residence, where 
the search was authorized by a third party “who possessed common authority over or 
other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected”). 
 24. See Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 11 (holding that where federal agents opened a 




open any containers found in the suspect’s outer clothing, without a 
warrant or probable cause.25
B.  The Reasonableness Requirement 
Even when the warrant requirement does not apply, the Justices have 
concluded that any search or seizure must be reasonable.  The Supreme 
Court has applied the Fourth Amendment to such diverse activities as 
auto checkpoints,26 random drug testing,27 and the use of beepers to 
follow suspects.28
The justification demanded by the Court depends on the Justices’ 
views with respect to the intrusiveness of government conduct.  In some 
cases, the Court requires that law enforcement officers possess probable 
cause.29  In other situations, government conduct is lawful if law 
enforcement officers satisfy a less demanding “reasonable suspicion” 
standard.30  And the Court has held that some purely random searches do 
footlocker without a warrant, the officers violated the Fourth Amendment).  But cf. 
Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 569–81 (holding that a police officer could open a paper bag in the 
suspect’s car without a warrant, if the officer had probable clause to believe that the 
paper bag contained incriminating evidence). 
 25. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224–37 (1973) (holding that 
where a police officer arrested a suspect, the officer could open a cigarette package in the 
suspect’s coat without obtaining a warrant). 
 26. Compare City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37–48 (2000) (holding 
that random auto stops at a narcotics checkpoint violated the Fourth Amendment) with 
Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 449–55 (1990) (concluding that 
random auto stops at a sobriety checkpoint did not violate the Fourth Amendment). 
 27. Compare Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 828–38 (2002) (upholding 
random drug tests of all students who participate in competitive extracurricular 
activities) with Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 313–23 (1997) (random drug testing of 
candidates running for state offices violated the Fourth Amendment). 
 28. Compare United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 716–18 (1984) (holding that 
when federal agents tracked a beeper that entered a residence without first obtaining a 
warrant, the agents violated the Fourth Amendment) with United States v. Knotts, 460 
U.S. 276, 284–85 (1983) (holding that where federal agents failed to obtain a warrant 
before tracking a beeper that traveled through the public streets, the agents did not 
violate the Fourth Amendment). 
 29. See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 46–52 (1970) (holding that 
police officers needed probable cause to search an automobile, but the officers did not 
need a warrant); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769–71 (1966) (holding that in a 
driving under the influence case, police officers needed probable cause before requiring 
that a suspect take a blood test, but the officers did not need a warrant). 
 30. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (holding that where a police 
officer has reasonable grounds to believe that any suspect is armed and dangerous, the 
officer may “conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in 
an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him”); New Jersey v. 
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 333–48 (1985) (holding that a high school vice principal could 
search a student’s purse, where the vice principal had “reasonable grounds” to believe 
that the student had violated a school rule). 
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not violate the Fourth Amendment.31
Like the Court’s warrant clause decisions, the Court’s review of 
warrantless government conduct seems arbitrary and ad hoc.  The Court 
has permitted random drug tests of high school students who participate 
in extracurricular activities.32  However, random drug tests of candidates 
for public office are unacceptable.33  The Court has upheld brief auto 
checkpoints to intercept drunk drivers or illegal immigrants.34  But the 
Court also has struck down a brief auto checkpoint, where police officers 
used drug detecting dogs to sniff for narcotics.35
III.  PROFESSOR AMAR’S ACCOUNT OF FOURTH AMENDMENT HISTORY 
In his interpretation of Fourth Amendment history, Professor Amar 
emphasizes two assertions.  Contrary to the traditional warrant 
preference rule, Professor Amar contends that the Fourth Amendment 
actually reflects the framers’ view that warrants were dangerous.  
However, consistent with mainstream doctrine, Professor Amar argues that 
the Fourth Amendment imposes a general reasonableness requirement on 
all searches and seizures.36
 31. See, e.g., Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 618–34 
(1989) (upholding random and warrantless drug tests of railway workers); Sitz, 496 U.S. 
at 449–55 (holding that random and warrantless auto stops at a sobriety checkpoint did 
not violate the Fourth Amendment). 
 32. See Earls, 536 U.S. at 828–38 (upholding random drug tests of all students 
who participated in extracurricular activities); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 
U.S. 646, 652–64 (1995) (upholding random drug tests of students who participated in 
interscholastic athletics). 
 33. See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 313–23 (1997) (holding that random 
drug testing of candidates for state office violated the Fourth Amendment). 
 34. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 449–55 (holding that random and warrantless auto stops at a 
sobriety checkpoint did not violate the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554–67 (1976) (concluding that where the Border Patrol stopped 
cars briefly at a fixed checkpoint to search for illegal aliens, the checkpoint did not 
violate the Fourth Amendment). 
 35. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37–48 (2000) (holding that 
random auto stops at a narcotics checkpoint violated the Fourth Amendment). 
 36. Professor Amar also disagrees with the exclusionary rule as the appropriate 
remedy for Fourth Amendment violations.  See Amar, Fourth Amendment First 
Principles, supra note 2, at 785–800.  Under this rule, evidence obtained in violation of 
the Fourth Amendment typically is excluded at a subsequent criminal trial.  See, e.g., 
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914) (concluding that if illegally obtained 
items may be “held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the 
protection of the Fourth Amendment declaring his right to be secure against such 
searches and seizures is of no value”); see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) 
(holding that the exclusionary rule applies in state court cases). 




A.  Warrants 
Building on the earlier work of Professor Telford Taylor,37 Professor 
Amar begins with the accurate observation that the text of the Fourth 
Amendment nowhere requires warrants.38  But for Professor Amar, this 
does not simply indicate that warrants were not mandated.  According to 
Professor Amar, the framers actually believed that warrants were 
dangerous, and sought to limit their use.39  Professor Amar cites a 
number of statements criticizing the warrant requirement40—although 
many of these statements almost certainly were directed at the general 
warrant, and not the specific warrant described in the text of the Fourth 
Amendment.41
Professor Amar writes that the framers’ uneasiness about warrants was 
related to the framing-era remedy for Fourth Amendment violations.  In 
the eighteenth century, the victim of an unreasonable search would seek 
damages “in an ordinary trespass suit—with both parties represented at 
trial and a jury deciding between the government and the citizen.”42
According to Professor Amar, the framers viewed such damage suits as 
the most effective deterrent to unreasonable searches.  Professor Amar 
writes that in the English John Wilkes cases, the victims of unreasonable 
searches “had recovered a King’s ransom from civil juries to teach 
arrogant officialdom a lesson and to deter future abuse.”43
However, such trespass suits would not succeed if law enforcement 
officials had obtained a warrant.  Professor Amar writes that “a lawful 
The priopriety of the exclusionary rule is beyond the scope of this Article.  But as 
indicated in subsection C of this Part, I have some serious reservations about this rule.  
See infra text accompanying notes 58–70.
 37. Professor Taylor concluded that the framers did not view the warrant as 
providing “protection against unreasonable searches . . . .”  TELFORD TAYLOR, TWO 
STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 41 (1969).  Instead, the framers regarded 
the warrant “as an authority for unreasonable and oppressive searches . . . .”  Id.  
According to Professor Taylor, with the “[e]xaltation of the warrant as the touchstone of 
‘reasonableness,’” Supreme Court Justices and commentators “have stood the fourth 
amendment on its head.”  Id. at 23–24. 
 38. Amar, The Writs of Assistance, supra note 2, at 60; see also Amar, Fourth 
Amendment First Principles, supra note 2, at 763 (“[A]lthough many states featured 
language akin to the Fourth Amendment, none had a textual warrant requirement.”). 
 39. Amar, The Writs of Assistance, supra note 2, at 60; Amar, Terry and Fourth 
Amendment First Principles, supra note 2, at 1099, 1111, 1113; see also, AMAR, THE 
BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 72–73.  Professor Amar compares warrants to the 
modern-day temporary restraining order.  With respect to warrants, Professor Amar 
concludes that the framers “imposed strict limits on these dangerous devices.”  AMAR, 
THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 73. 
 40. See, e.g., Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, supra note 2, at 778. 
 41. See infra text accompanying notes 75–83 (discussing the difference between 
the general warrant and the specific warrant). 
 42. Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, supra note 2, at 774. 
 43. Id. at 797. 
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warrant would provide—indeed, was designed to provide—an absolute 
defense in any subsequent trespass suit.”44  The framers sought to limit 
the use of warrants, “otherwise, central officers on the government 
payroll in ex parte proceedings would usurp the role of the good old jury 
in striking the proper balance between government and citizen after 
hearing lawyers on both sides.”45  Professor Amar concludes that 
“[w]arrants . . . were friends of the officer, not the citizen; and so warrants 
had to be strictly limited . . . .”46  In other words: “Judges and warrants 
are the heavies, not the heroes, of our story.”47
B.  Reasonableness 
According to Professor Amar, the Fourth Amendment does not require 
warrants, but instead imposes a global reasonableness requirement on all 
searches and seizures.  Professor Amar describes arguments that the 
Fourth Amendment does not protect office buildings, cars, and computer 
disks as “an outlandish and crabbed approach.”48  Although Professor 
Amar clearly is critical of the Supreme Court’s work in Fourth 
Amendment cases,49 Professor Amar does agree with the Court’s 
premise that the Fourth Amendment applies to all searches and seizures. 
Professor Amar is somewhat vague about the meaning of Fourth 
Amendment reasonableness, given the importance of the reasonableness 
requirement in Professor Amar’s conception of the Fourth Amendment.  
Some of the relevant considerations would include “the importance of 
finding what the government is looking for, the intrusiveness of the 
search, the identity of the search target, the availability of other means of 
achieving the purpose of the search, and so on.”50
Professor Amar also writes that Fourth Amendment reasonableness 
 44. Id. at 774. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Amar, The Writs of Assistance, supra note 2, at 60. 
 47. Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, supra note 2, at 1179; see also 
AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 69 (“Because juries could often be trusted 
more than judges to protect against government overreaching . . . warrants were 
generally disfavored . . . .”). 
 48. Amar, The Writs of Assistance, supra note 2, at 68–69; see also, Amar, Terry 
and Fourth Amendment First Principles, supra note 2, at 1100 (arguing that the Fourth 
Amendment terms “searches” and “seizures” “should be generously construed”). 
 49. See Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, supra note 2, at 763–71 
(criticizing the Supreme Court’s warrant preference rule and the exceptions to the rule). 
 50. Id. at 801. 




should be determined “in light of other constitutional provisions.”51  For 
example, given the First Amendment protection of freedom of the press, 
“a search or seizure of newspaper files should cause special alarm and 
require special safeguards.”52  According to Professor Amar, the other 
constitutional provisions that should inform Fourth Amendment analysis 
include the First Amendment right to freedom of speech, the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel, the Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination 
Clause, the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause, and the 
Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.53
In another example of Professor Amar’s constitutional reasonableness 
analysis, he discusses a relationship between the Fifth Amendment 
Takings Clause and the Fourth Amendment by suggesting the following 
hypothetical54: 
The grand jury subpoenas a witness of modest means to appear before it, at her 
own expense, for weeks upon end.  Surely, this is a Fourth Amendment 
“seizure,” and even if the Takings Clause does not strictly apply—the grand 
jury is seizing and using a person, not property—could the Clause not inform a 
ruling that, at some point, minimum compensation would be required to render 
the Fourth Amendment “seizure” “reasonable”?55
Regardless of whether one agrees with Professor Amar’s observations 
on constitutional reasonableness, this approach is not an originalist 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.  Professor Amar cites no 
historical authority for his argument that the Fourth Amendment requires 
the government to provide reasonable compensation to grand jury 
witnesses.  Indeed, Professor Amar rarely cites historical sources in his 
discussion of Fourth Amendment reasonableness.56
Professor Amar’s omission of historical sources is not a mere 
oversight.  As discussed below, the framers never endorsed the global 
reasonableness requirement proposed by Professor Amar.57  Instead, the 
framers enacted the Fourth Amendment to deal with a much more 
narrow and specific problem—house searches pursuant to a general 
warrant, or no warrant at all. 
C.  The Attractiveness of Professor Amar’s Account 
The attractiveness of Professor Amar’s account is closely linked to the 
 51. Id. at 805. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 804–11. 
 54. Id. at 807–08. 
 55. Id. (citations omitted). 
 56. But cf. id. at 805 (citing the John Wilkes cases as an illustration of “the special 
dangers posed by the government’s searching and seizing documents from the press”). 
 57. See infra text accompanying notes 93–126. 
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use of the exclusionary rule as a remedy for Fourth Amendment 
violations.  Under the exclusionary rule, evidence obtained in violation 
of the Fourth Amendment typically must be excluded from a criminal 
trial.58  In cases where law enforcement officers violate the Fourth 
Amendment, a defendant who committed a crime may be impossible to 
convict. 
Under the traditional warrant preference rule, Fourth Amendment 
cases often involve a familiar pattern.  Law enforcement officers engage 
in a warrantless search.  The search produces incriminating evidence, 
which would convict the defendant.  The defense then argues that the 
warrantless search violated the Fourth Amendment, and that the court 
must exclude the incriminating evidence. 
The exclusionary rule places considerable pressure on judges to find 
that law enforcement activities did not violate the Fourth Amendment.59  
Judges want juries to hear the probative evidence.60  But this will occur 
only if law enforcement agents act lawfully. 
For judges seeking a way to conclude that a warrant is not required, 
Professor Amar’s Fourth Amendment account has an obvious appeal.  
Professor Amar contends that the Fourth Amendment was never 
intended to require warrants.  Instead, the amendment simply requires 
that searches must be “reasonable.”  If Professor Amar’s interpretation is 
correct, a court may find that law enforcement agents did not need to 
obtain a warrant, that their search was reasonable, and that probative 
evidence is admissible. 
 58. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (holding that the 
exclusionary rule applies in state court cases); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 
(1914) (holding that the exclusionary rule applies in federal court cases). 
 59. Professor Amar recognizes that the exclusionary rule imposes pressure on 
judges to conclude that law enforcement officers have not violated the Fourth 
Amendment.  See Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, supra note 2, at 799 
(“Judges do not like excluding bloody knives, so they distort doctrine, claiming the 
Fourth Amendment was not really violated.”); see also United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 
897, 907 (1984) (“The substantial social costs exacted by the exclusionary rule for the 
vindication of Fourth Amendment rights have long been a source of concern.”); 8 JOHN 
HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2184a, at 52 n.44 (John T. 
McNaughton ed., 1961) (contending that the exclusionary rule creates pressure on judges 
to reduce Fourth Amendment protections); Guido Calabresi, The Exclusionary Rule, 26 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 111, 112 (2003) (asserting that the exclusionary rule imposes 
pressure on judges to conclude that no Fourth Amendment violation has occurred, 
because judges do not want to exclude probative evidence). 
 60. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 254 (1983) (noting that because of “the 
inherent trustworthiness of seized tangible evidence and the resulting social costs from 
its loss through suppression,” application of the exclusionary rule has been restricted). 




In Illinois v. Rodriguez,61 the U.S. Supreme Court issued a Fourth 
Amendment decision that seemed to be driven by exclusionary rule 
pressures.  Police officers found cocaine in the apartment where Edward 
Rodriguez lived.62  Gail Fischer had consented to a warrantless search of 
this apartment.  Police officers believed that Fischer was the girlfriend of 
Rodriguez, and that Fischer had common authority to authorize the 
warrantless search.63  However, the Illinois state courts held: “Fischer 
did not have common authority over the apartment.”64
Based on these facts, Rodriguez seems like an easy case.  Police 
officers had engaged in an unauthorized, warrantless intrusion into a 
residence.  The officers had violated the Fourth Amendment.  Therefore, 
the courts must suppress the cocaine found by the officers. 
But that is not what happened.  Instead, the Rodriquez Court reversed 
a lower court determination that the police officers had violated the 
Fourth Amendment.65  In a passage that sounds very similar to Professor 
Amar’s text, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote: “The ordinary requirement of 
a warrant is sometimes supplanted by other elements that render the 
unconsented search ‘reasonable.’”66  Justice Scalia concluded that if the 
police officers had reasonably relied on Gail Fischer’s suggestions of 
common authority, then the warrantless search of the apartment was 
lawful.67
The reasoning that appears in Rodriguez borders on incoherent.  
Consent searches occur where a defendant voluntarily waives his or her 
Fourth Amendment protections, such as the protection against warrantless 
searches.68  How could someone with no authority over Rodriguez’s 
apartment waive Rodriguez’s Fourth Amendment rights, and authorize a 
warrantless search of the apartment?69
 61. 497 U.S. 177 (1990). 
 62. Id. at 180. 
 63. Id. at 179 (“Fischer several times referred to the apartment on South California 
as ‘our’ apartment, and said that she had clothes and furniture there.”). 
 64. Id. at 180. 
 65. Id. at 189. 
 66. Id. at 185.  Rodriguez predates Professor Amar’s Fourth Amendment 
publications.  It seems unlikely that Professor Amar’s theories influenced the results in 
this case. 
 67. Id. at 184–89.  The Rodriguez Court remanded the case, allowing the Illinois 
courts to determine if the police officers reasonably relied on Gail Fischer’s claim of 
common authority.  Id. at 189. 
 68. But cf. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 246 n.34 (1973) (discussing 
“the fundamentally different nature of a consent search from the waiver of a trial right”). 
 69. For another incoherent Fourth Amendment decision that seems driven by 
exclusionary rule pressures, see Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79 (1987).  Police 
officers obtained a valid search warrant for a third-floor apartment rented by Lawrence 
McWebb.  When the officers arrived at the Baltimore, Maryland apartment building, 
they did not realize that the third floor of the building was divided into two apartments.  
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But while the reasoning of the Rodriguez Court may be unsatisfying, it 
is hard to feel outrage about the result.  Edward Rodriguez was a drug 
dealer, just as culpable as any other drug dealer.  Based on common 
sense principles of equal treatment, Rodriguez should face the same 
penalty as any other, equally culpable drug dealer.  Those same common 
sense principles are offended by the suggestion that probative, 
incriminating evidence should be excluded when Rodriguez faces trial, 
because police officers made a mistake.70
The Rodriguez decision illustrates how the exclusionary rule drives 
Fourth Amendment doctrine.  If courts must adhere to a bright-line 
warrant requirement, judges in cases like Rodriguez must exclude 
evidence obtained in warrantless searches.  But if the Fourth Amendment 
requires only that the state must satisfy Professor Amar’s fuzzy 
Lawrence McWebb lived in one apartment.  Harold Garrison lived in the other 
apartment.  Id. at 80. 
Police officers searched Garrison’s apartment, believing that the apartment was part of 
McWebb’s residence.  Inside of Garrison’s apartment, the officers discovered heroin.  Id. at 80. 
Garrison was charged with possessing heroin with intent to distribute it.  After the 
evidence was admitted at Garrison’s criminal trial, Garrison was convicted.  Id. at 80–81. 
 Initially, Garrison seems like an easy case.  The officers did not have a warrant or 
probable cause to search Garrison’s apartment.  No exigent circumstances justified the 
search.  Therefore, it would seem that the search violated the Fourth Amendment, and 
that the evidence found inside of the apartment could not be used against Garrison. 
But that is not what the Garrison Court held.  Instead, the Garrison Court upheld the 
search.  Justice John Paul Stevens wrote that “the officers properly responded to the 
command contained in a valid warrant even if the warrant is interpreted as authorizing a 
search limited to McWebb’s apartment rather than the entire third floor.”  Id. at 88.  
According to Justice Stevens: “[T]he Court has also recognized the need to allow some 
latitude for honest mistakes that are made by officers in the dangerous and difficult 
process of making arrests and executing search warrants.”  Id. at 87.  Justice Stevens thus 
concluded that “the officers’ conduct was consistent with a reasonable effort to ascertain 
and identify the place intended to be searched within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.”  Id. at 88–89. 
As in Rodriguez, the reasoning in Garrison borders on incoherent.  But also like 
Rodriguez, it is difficult to feel real outrage with the outcome.  Like Edward Rodriguez, 
Harold Garrison was a drug dealer.  For a jury to reach a just outcome in Garrison’s case, 
the jury should be able to hear about the incriminating evidence that police officers 
found in Garrison’s apartment.  If the Garrison Court concluded that the Baltimore 
police officers had violated the Fourth Amendment, the jury probably would not have 
heard this evidence. 
 70. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907–08 (1984) (stating that “when 
law enforcement officers have acted in objective good faith or their transgressions have 
been minor,” application of the exclusionary rule “offends basic concepts of the criminal 
justice system”); Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, supra note 2, at 799 (“In 
the popular mind, the [Fourth] Amendment has lost its luster and become associated with 
grinning criminals getting off on crummy technicalities.”). 




“reasonableness” standard, then judges will be able to conclude that 
police conduct was reasonable, and a court may admit the incriminating 
evidence.  Given the pressures imposed by the exclusionary rule, 
Professor Amar’s reasonableness standard offers an obvious attraction to 
judges and commentators. 
IV.  ANALYZING PROFESSOR AMAR’S HISTORICAL ASSERTIONS 
In his interpretation of Fourth Amendment history, Professor Amar 
reaches two central conclusions about the Fourth Amendment.  First, the 
framers believed that warrants were dangerous.  The Fourth Amendment 
did not prefer warrants, but instead sought to limit the use of warrants.  
Second, the Fourth Amendment imposed a general reasonableness 
requirement on all government searches and seizures.  The historical 
record does not support either of Professor Amar’s conclusions. 
A.  The Framers Were Not Hostile to Specific Warrants 
Professor Amar’s assertion that the framers viewed all warrants as 
dangerous is not supported by the historical record.  Without question, 
the framers were hostile to general warrants—warrants that were so 
broad as to impose no restraints at all.  But contrary to Professor Amar’s 
assertion, the framers did not oppose specific warrants.  In fact, the 
framers accepted house searches only pursuant to specific warrants. 
Professor Amar’s discussion of warrants raises a number of valid 
points.  First, the text of the Fourth Amendment does not impose any 
requirement that government agents obtain a warrant before conducting 
a search or seizure.  The Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable” 
searches.71  The amendment then imposes limitations on the issuance of 
warrants.  The amendment provides that warrants cannot be issued “but 
upon probable cause,” and that warrants must describe with particularity 
“the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”72
Second, the Fourth Amendment was not intended to impose a warrant 
requirement on all government investigations.  With respect to searches 
and seizures in early America, Gerard Bradley accurately observes: 
“Warrantless searches, then as now, were the rule rather than the 
exception, and each of the thirteen colonies, and then states, as a 
common statutory practice, authorized them.”73  As support for this 
proposition, Bradley cites a long list of colonial, state, and federal laws 
 71. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Gerard V. Bradley, Present at the Creation?  A Critical Guide to Weeks v. 
United States and Its Progeny, 30 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1031, 1041 (1986). 
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that did indeed authorize warrantless searches and seizures.74
Third, the framers were strongly opposed to house searches pursuant 
to a particular type of warrant—the general warrant.  In fact, the first 
state constitutional provision enacted in America imposed a 
straightforward ban against general warrants.  In Article X of the 
Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776, the Virginia legislature provided 
that general warrants “are grievous and oppressive, and ought not to be 
granted.”75
However, Professor Amar makes a critical error in suggesting that 
when the framers opposed general warrants, they intended to limit the 
use of all search warrants.  To the contrary, the framers opposed general 
warrants because such warrants did not effectively restrain law 
enforcement officers.  The Virginia declaration itself explained the 
deficiencies of the general warrant.  First, general warrants were 
deficient because such warrants permitted law enforcement officers to 
search “places without evidence of a fact committed . . . .”76  In other 
words, the general warrant typically lacked sufficient evidentiary 
support.  General warrants also were deficient because such warrants 
permitted law enforcement officers “to seize any person or persons not 
named, or whose offence is not particularly described and supported by 
evidence . . . .”77  In other words, such warrants did not narrowly specify 
the places that law enforcement officers could search.  In short, general 
warrants provided law enforcement officers with too much discretion. 
In fact, the most prominent theme in early discussions of unreasonable 
searches and seizures focused on the unrestrained discretion that law 
enforcement officers could exercise pursuant to a general warrant.  In his 
1721 treatise, Matthew Hale concluded that general warrants were “not 
justifiable” because these warrants gave so much discretion to the law 
enforcement officers that the warrants made them “to be in effect the 
 74. Id. at 1041–45 nn.64–65.  Bradley’s citations are consistent with my argument 
in Part V of this Article.  I conclude that the Fourth Amendment was intended to apply 
only to house searches—and not to other types of government intrusions.  See infra text 
accompanying notes 141–205. 
 75. VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. X, reprinted in 7 THE FEDERAL AND 
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE 
STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES 
OF AMERICA 3814, § 10 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909) [hereinafter THE FEDERAL 
AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS]. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 




judge . . . .”78  In January 1761, James Otis, a prominent Boston attorney, 
argued against the use of writs of assistance—the American version of 
the general warrant.79  Specifically, Otis complained that with a writ of 
assistance, customs officials “may enter our houses when they please—
 . . . may break locks, bars and every thing in their way—and whether 
they break through malice or revenge, no man, no court can 
inquire . . . .”80  And at a Boston town meeting in 1772, Samuel Adams 
attacked the writs of assistance.  Adams asserted: “[O]ur homes and 
even our bed chambers, are exposed to be ransacked, our boxes chests & 
trunks broke open ravaged and plundered by wretches . . . whenever they 
are pleased to say they suspect there are in the house wares etc. for 
which the dutys have not been paid.”81
For early Americans, the cure for the problems raised by the general 
warrant was not warrantless house searches—but rather house searches 
conducted pursuant to specific warrants.  Unlike the minimal evidentiary 
showings required for a general warrant, the specific warrant required 
that law enforcement officers demonstrate “probable cause” before a 
court could issue the warrant.82  And while a general warrant did not 
limit the scope of government investigations, a specific warrant must 
describe with particularity “the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized.”83
Early American statutes contradict Professor Amar’s claim that the 
framers sought to limit the use of all warrants—both general and 
specific.  Two sections of the 1789 Collections Act authorized the 
warrantless search of vessels for customs violations.84  But as Tracey 
Maclin has observed, a third section of the act required a specific 
warrant before customs agents could search buildings.85
In fact, several scholars also have noted that a number of early state 
statutes required specific warrants.86  In 1783, the Massachusetts legislature 
 78. See 2 MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 150 
(Sollom Emlyn ed., 1736). 
 79. M.H. SMITH, THE WRITS OF ASSISTANCE CASE 344 (1978). 
 80. Id. 
 81. A State of the Rights of the Colonists, in TRACTS OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION, 1763–1776, at 233, 243 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1967) [hereinafter A State of 
the Rights of the Colonists] (report typically attributed to Samuel Adams). 
 82. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (providing that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation”). 
 83. Id.; see also Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 
98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 650–54 (1999) (contrasting the specific warrant with the general 
warrant). 
 84. Collections Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 29, 44–45 (1789). 
 85. Collections Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 29, 43 (1789); see Maclin, supra note 5, at 963 
(noting that this section of the Collections Act required a specific warrant). 
 86. See Morgan Cloud, Searching through History; Searching for History, 63 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1707, 1727 (1996) (book review) (“By 1787, many of the new states 
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required that any law enforcement officer must obtain a specific warrant 
before searching a house for smuggled goods.87  However, as William 
Cuddihy observes, the officer “could search structures other than 
dwellings without a warrant, but only if the informant told him, under 
oath and in writing, both where the taxable goods had been smuggled 
and where they had been taken.”88  In 1780 and 1785, the Pennsylvania 
legislature enacted statutes that required specific warrants for house 
searches, but not for searches of other premises.89
The Massachusetts and Pennsylvania statutory requirements that law 
enforcement officers must obtain a specific warrant before they engaged 
in house searches is particularly noteworthy.  As discussed in Part V of 
this Article, the Fourth Amendment was enacted to regulate house 
searches.90  As Thomas Davies has observed, the historical concerns 
resulting in the Fourth Amendment “were almost exclusively about the 
need to ban house searches under general warrants.”91  And when it 
came to physical intrusions into the most sacred place—the home—the 
Massachusetts legislature and the Pennsylvania legislature required that 
government agents must obtain a specific warrant. 
Of course, these statutory examples do not conclusively prove that the 
Fourth Amendment required warrants.  However, these examples do 
demonstrate a critical flaw in Professor Amar’s historical interpretation.  
Having read the many early American denunciations of the general 
warrant, Professor Amar concludes that Americans opposed all warrants, 
except in special circumstances.  But as Professor Morgan Cloud has 
written: “If warrants, particularly specific warrants, were seen as the 
enemies of privacy and liberty, and not as a restriction upon government 
power,” then statutes that required specific warrants “make little 
sense.”92
In fact, the framers only opposed the use of the general warrant.  It 
was the general warrant that gave law enforcement officers unrestrained 
already had gone farther than England in adopting specific warrants as a replacement for 
general warrants.”); Cuddihy, supra note 5, at 1290–96; Maclin, supra note 5, at 957. 
 87. Cuddihy, supra note 5, at 1291. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Davies, supra note 83, at 681–83. 
 90. See infra text accompanying notes 141–205. 
 91. Davies, supra note 83, at 551. 
 92. Cloud, supra note 86, at 1731; see also id. (failing to distinguish between 
specific and general warrants “is to simply miss one of the important historical 
developments in the years preceding the ratification of the Fourth Amendment”). 




discretion to enter and search houses.  The framers did not intend to cure 
this abuse of authority by profoundly limiting the use of warrants, as 
Professor Amar contends.  Instead, the framers viewed the specific 
warrant as the cure for unjustified house searches.  Professor Amar’s 
faulty premise about the framers’ distrust of all warrants raises questions 
about the rest of his historical account. 
B.  The Fourth Amendment Did Not Impose a Global                
Reasonableness Standard 
In his interpretation of Fourth Amendment history, Professor Amar’s 
central proposition is that the Fourth Amendment was intended to impose a 
global “reasonableness” requirement on all government searches and 
seizures.93  Professor Amar’s assumption is shared by the U.S. Supreme 
Court.  The Court has assumed that the Fourth Amendment imposes a 
reasonableness requirement on all searches and seizures—even where 
the government activity does not require a warrant, and takes place 
outside of any residence.94
Both Professor Amar and the Supreme Court have cited surprisingly 
little authority for their conclusion that the Fourth Amendment was 
intended to impose a reasonableness requirement on all searches and 
seizures.  In fact, a review of the historical record strongly suggests that 
this conclusion is incorrect.  Three historical examples are particularly 
worth attention.  First, eighteenth-century and early nineteenth-century 
court decisions almost never mentioned constitutional search and seizure 
provisions.  Second, the Fourth Amendment was not raised or discussed 
in early ship seizure cases.  Third, Thomas Cooley’s Michigan Supreme 
Court opinion in Weimer v. Bunbry95 explicitly rejects the view that 
constitutional search and seizure provisions imposed a global 
reasonableness requirement on all searches and seizures. 
1.  The Dearth of Early Search and Seizure Opinions 
The lack of eighteenth-century and early-nineteenth century published 
opinions on constitutional search and seizure provisions is remarkable.  
 93. See Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, supra note 2, at 801–11. 
 94. See, e.g., Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450 (1990) (“[A] 
Fourth Amendment ‘seizure’ occurs when a vehicle is stopped at a checkpoint.”); 
Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989) (holding that the 
Fourth Amendment applies to random drug tests); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 
357–59 (1967) (concluding that the warrantless use of a wiretap to monitor conversations 
made from a public telephone booth violated the Fourth Amendment). 
 95. 30 Mich. 200 (1874). 
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Prior to the U.S. Supreme Court opinion in Boyd v. United States,96 
constitutional search and seizure provisions probably were mentioned in 
fewer than fifty cases.97
Admittedly, prior to the twentieth century, the Fourth Amendment of 
the U.S. Constitution only applied to the federal government.98  During 
the eighteenth century and the early nineteenth century, most criminal 
laws were enacted by the states, not the federal government.99  In early 
America, most criminal prosecutions took place in the state courts, 
where the Fourth Amendment did not apply. 
But during the eighteenth century and the early nineteenth century, 
most state constitutions contained search and seizure provisions, using 
language that was very similar or identical to the Fourth Amendment.100  
And yet published state court opinions rarely mentioned these state 
constitutional search and seizure provisions.  And when attorneys did 
raise the state provisions, arguments that the government had engaged in 
an unreasonable search or seizure were quickly dismissed. 
For example, in the 1814 case of Wakely v. Hart,101 Wakely argued 
that his warrantless arrest had violated a Pennsylvania constitutional 
provision, which prohibited unreasonable searches and seizures.102  The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court quickly concluded that the arrest did not 
violate the state constitutional provision.103  Similarly, in the 1817 case 
 96. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
 97. See Davies, supra note 83, at 611–19. 
 98. See Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 71, 76 (1855) (rejecting a Fourth 
Amendment challenge to a Maryland state statute, because the Fourth Amendment 
applied only to the federal government). 
 99. See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, Federalizing Crime: Assessing the Impact on the 
Federal Courts, 543 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 39, 40 (1996) (noting that the 
original scope of federal criminal law was very narrow and that “[u]ntil the Civil War, 
there were only a small number of federal offenses, and they generally dealt with injury 
to or interference with the federal government itself or its programs”); NELSON B. 
LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED 
STATES CONSTITUTION 106 (1937) (observing that in the nineteenth century, “the limited 
criminal jurisdiction of the Federal Government was not exercised by Congress except in 
minor instances”); Thomas J. Maroney, Fifty Years of Federalization of Criminal Law: 
Sounding the Alarm or “Crying Wolf?”, 50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1317, 1319–20 (2000) 
(noting that because the eighteenth-century federal government was “small and 
conducted few programs, the list of offenses was short”). 
 100. See Davies, supra note 83, at 674–86. 
 101. 6 Binn. 315 (Pa. 1814). 
 102. See Davies, supra note 83, at 615 (describing Wakely v. Hart as “probably the 
most widely cited early American case on the law of arrest”). 
 103. Wakely, 6 Binn. at 318. 




of Mayo v. Wilson,104 the New Hampshire Supreme Court wrote that a 
warrantless arrest did not violate the New Hampshire Constitution, 
which prohibited unreasonable searches and seizures.105  In the 1838 
opinion in Banks v. Farwell,106 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Council held that a warrantless search of a shop did not violate a state 
constitutional search and seizure provision.  The decisions in Mayo and 
Banks are particularly relevant, because the Massachusetts and New 
Hampshire constitutional search and seizure provisions used language 
that largely mirrored the federal Fourth Amendment.107
If early American lawyers and judges understood that the Fourth 
Amendment imposed a general reasonableness requirement on all searches 
and seizures, one would expect these lawyers and judges to discuss the 
constitutional search and seizure provisions frequently in civil and 
criminal cases.  Yet in the court opinions published in early America, the 
search and seizure provisions were rarely mentioned.  And when 
attorneys did raise constitutional search and seizure arguments, courts 
typically dismissed those arguments with little discussion.  The dearth of 
early American search and seizure decisions raises considerable doubt 
about whether the framers intended the Fourth Amendment to impose a 
general reasonableness requirement on all searches and seizures. 
2.  The Ship Seizure Cases 
The regulation of shipping was one area where the early federal 
government did engage in searches and seizures.  Early federal statutes 
often permitted ship seizures with only minimal evidentiary support.  So 
if the Fourth Amendment did indeed impose a general reasonableness 
requirement, attorneys representing the shipowners would be expected to 
argue that these early federal ship seizures were unreasonable, and 
violated the Fourth Amendment. 
But this was not the case.  In the early nineteenth-century cases that 
reached the U.S. Supreme Court, the Justices never invalidated a ship 
seizure on Fourth Amendment grounds.  More significantly, the 
attorneys representing the shipowners never even argued that the federal 
statutes violated the Fourth Amendment.  The failure of shipowners to 
 104. 1 N.H. 53 (1817). 
 105. Id. at 59–60. 
 106. 38 Mass. (21 Pick.) 156 (1839). 
 107. See MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 1, art. XIV, reprinted in 3 THE FEDERAL AND 
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 75, at 1891 (providing that every subject “has a right 
to be secure from all unreasonable searches, and seizures, of his person, his houses, his 
papers, and all his possessions”); N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. 1, art. XIX, reprinted in 4 
THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 75, at 2456 (using the same 
language as the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780). 
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raise a Fourth Amendment argument casts considerable doubt on 
Professor Amar’s central contention, that the Fourth Amendment 
imposed a general reasonableness requirement. 
In Little v. Barreme,108 the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed a federal 
statute, which gave federal officers the right to “stop and examine any 
ship or vessel of the United States on the high seas,” if “there may be 
reason to suspect” that the vessel was sailing to France.109  The Supreme 
Court ultimately struck down the ship seizure in Little, but only because 
the federal statute did not authorize a seizure of this particular type of 
ship.110  In Little, neither the litigants nor the Justices mentioned the 
Fourth Amendment. 
In The Apollon,111 the Supreme Court dealt with the seizure of a vessel 
under a 1799 statute, which authorized ship seizures where a vessel 
arriving from a foreign port failed to report to a U.S. customs 
collector.112  The Apollon Court held that the ship seizure was not 
authorized by the statute, because the vessel passed through U.S. waters 
to dock in Florida, at that time a territory of Spain.113  As in Little, the 
Fourth Amendment was not mentioned by either the litigants or the 
Justices in The Apollon. 
The framers apparently believed that federal ship seizures would be 
regulated by statutes, and not by the Fourth Amendment.  For example, 
in the 1789 Collections Act, Congress approved the warrantless search 
of vessels for customs violations.114  If the Fourth Amendment already 
governed ship searches, this statutory regulation would be redundant.  
Congress needed to enact the Collections Act only if the Fourth 
Amendment did not apply to searches of ships.115
In the early ship seizure cases, both the attorneys and the Justices 
seemed to understand that the Fourth Amendment simply did not apply 
to searches or seizures of ships.  Although Professor Amar contends that 
 108. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804). 
 109. Id. at 177 (emphasis omitted). 
 110. Id. at 176, 179.  Congress only had authorized the seizure of ships sailing from 
America to France.  Id. at 177.  The vessel in Little was sailing from a French port to a 
Danish port.  Id. at 176. 
 111. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362 (1824). 
 112. Id. at 368. 
 113. Id. at 369–71. 
 114. Collections Act of 1789, § 24, 1 Stat. 29, 43-44 (1789). 
 115. But cf. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 150–51 (1925) (citing the 1789 
Collections Act as evidence that the Fourth Amendment was intended to apply to ship 
seizures). 




the Fourth Amendment imposes a general reasonableness standard on all 
searches and seizures, the ship seizure cases raise serious doubts about 
this contention. 
3.  Weimer v. Bunbury 
In the 1874 case of Weimer v. Bunbury,116 the Michigan Supreme 
Court held that a state repossession statute did not violate a Michigan 
constitutional provision regulating searches and seizures.  In holding that 
a government seizure outside of the home did not violate this state 
constitutional provision, Weimer is an unremarkable nineteenth-century 
case.  However, Weimer is significant because the opinion was written 
by Justice Thomas Cooley, one of the most prominent early 
commentators on the U.S. Constitution.  Justice Cooley’s views, 
expressed in Weimer and elsewhere, strongly suggest that the Fourth 
Amendment did not impose any general reasonableness standard on 
government activity outside of residences. 
The Michigan legislature had enacted a statute, which allowed the 
state to issue a “warrant” authorizing the repossession of property owned 
by delinquent tax collectors.  In Weimer v. Bunbury,117 the plaintiff 
alleged that this statute violated a Michigan state constitutional 
provision, which proscribed unreasonable searches and seizures.118  If 
Professor Amar’s interpretation of the constitutional search and seizure 
provisions is correct, then the Michigan Court should have determined 
whether the repossession statute was “reasonable.” 
But this was not the approach taken by Justice Cooley in Weimer.  In 
upholding the repossession statute, Justice Cooley wrote that the 
Michigan constitutional provision outlawing unreasonable searches and 
seizures was simply inapplicable.  According to Justice Cooley, the 
Michigan constitutional provision was intended for “something quite 
different from an open and public levy upon property after the usual 
method of execution levies . . . .”119  Justice Cooley continued that the 
state constitutional search and seizure provision “was to make sacred the 
privacy of the citizen’s dwelling and person against everything but 
process issued upon a showing of legal cause for invading it.”120
Admittedly, Weimer involved the interpretation of a state 
constitutional search and seizure provision, and not the federal Fourth 
 116. 30 Mich. 201 (1874). 
 117. Id. 
 118. MICH. CONST. art. VI, § 26 (providing that the “person, houses, papers and 
possessions of every person shall be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures”). 
 119. Weimer, 30 Mich. at 208. 
 120. Id. 
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Amendment.  However, the Weimer decision is completely consistent 
with Justice Cooley’s description of the federal Fourth Amendment.121
In his earlier treatise on the U.S. Constitution, Cooley did not discuss 
any general reasonableness requirement imposed by the Fourth 
Amendment.  Instead, Cooley emphasized that the Fourth Amendment 
was designed to regulate house searches.  In a treatise section titled 
“Unreasonable Searches and Seizures,”122 Cooley wrote: “The maxim 
that ‘every man’s house is his castle’ is made a part of our constitutional 
law in the clause prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures.”123  
Cooley continued that the origins of the Fourth Amendment derived 
from “the abuse of executive authority, and in the unwarrantable 
intrusion of executive agents into the houses and among the private 
papers of individuals . . . .”124
Justice Cooley’s discussion both in Weimer and in his influential 
treatise are entirely consistent with the prevailing nineteenth-century 
view of constitutional search and seizure provisions.125  In short, such 
provisions did not impose any global reasonableness requirements.  
Instead these provisions exclusively regulated house searches. 
4.  Summary 
On the question of whether the Fourth Amendment imposed some 
global reasonableness requirement on all government searches and 
seizures, the historical record is remarkably consistent.  The dearth of 
early search and seizure challenges, the ship seizure cases, and Justice 
 121. See infra text accompanying notes 122–25. 
 122. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 
WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 299 
(1868). 
 123. Id. at 299–300. 
 124. Id. at 300. 
 125. Admittedly, in 1878, the Supreme Court’s first decision on the Fourth 
Amendment struck down a statute authorizing courts to order the production of business 
records.  Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).  However, the Boyd decision came 
at the beginning of an era where the court attempted to protect businesses from 
government regulation. 
  The Boyd decision is consistent with the pro-business doctrine of substantive due 
process, and is not consistent with framing-era sources on the Fourth Amendment.  As 
Thomas Davies has observed, the assumption that the Fourth Amendment extended to 
commercial interests “reflects the pro-business activism of the late nineteenth- and early 
twentieth-century Supreme Court—not the original understanding of the [Fourth] 
Amendment.”  Davies, supra note 83, at 739. 




Cooley’s analysis in Weimer v. Bunbury126 all lead to the same 
conclusion.  Contrary to Professor Amar’s assertion, the Fourth Amendment 
did not impose any global reasonableness requirement on all government 
searches and seizures.  Instead, the amendment was designed solely to 
proscribe improper physical entries into houses. 
C.  The Exclusionary Rule and Fourth Amendment Rights 
Professor Amar observes that in early America, evidence obtained in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment was not excluded at the defendant’s 
subsequent criminal trial.  Professor Amar writes: “Supporters of the 
exclusionary rule cannot point to a single major statement from the 
Founding—or even the antebellum or Reconstruction eras—supporting 
Fourth Amendment exclusion of evidence in a criminal trial.”127
Professor Amar observes that instead of the exclusion of evidence, tort 
remedies were “clearly the ones presupposed by the Framers of the 
Fourth Amendment and counterpart state constitutional provisions.”128  
Warrants would bar these civil damages actions because “a lawful 
warrant would provide—indeed, was designed to provide—an absolute 
defense in any subsequent trespass suit.”129  Professor Amar concludes 
that the framers viewed warrants “as an enemy, not a friend.”130
Some of Professor Amar’s remedial observations are accurate and 
enlightening.  First, Professor Amar is correct that the exclusion of 
evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment was unknown 
in early America.131  Instead, the victim of an unlawful search would 
 126. 30 Mich. 201 (1874). 
 127. Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, supra note 2, at 786; see also 
Amar, Terry and Fourth Amendment First Principles, supra note 2, at 1127 (asserting 
that “no court in America ever excluded evidence on Fourth Amendment-like grounds 
for the first century after Independence”).
 128. Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, supra note 2, at 786. 
 129. Id. at 774. 
 130. Id. (quoting TAYLOR, supra note 37, at 41). 
 131. See, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 396 (1914) (stating that the 
admissibility of unlawfully obtained evidence in a criminal trial “has the sanction of so 
many state cases that it would be impracticable to cite or refer to them in detail”); Adams 
v. New York, 192 U.S. 585, 595 (1904) (concluding that “though papers and other 
subjects of evidence may have been illegally taken,” such evidence is admissible at a 
criminal trial); Paul G. Cassell, The Mysterious Creation Of Search and Seizure 
Exclusionary Rules Under State Constitutions: The Utah Example, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 
751, 758 (“Throughout most of the nineteenth century, the United States Supreme Court 
likewise did not consider exclusion of evidence a remedy for unlawful searches.”); 
Daniel M. Harris, Back to Basics: An Examination of the Exclusionary Rule in Light of 
Common Sense and the Supreme Court’s Original Search and Seizure Jurisprudence, 37 
ARK. L. REV. 646, 658 (1984) (stating that in early America, the “proper and adequate 
remedy” for an unlawful search or seizure was “a common law action for damages by 
the aggrieved party against the seizing officer”). 
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seek civil damages in a trespass suit.  As discussed in Part V, the 
eighteenth-century John Wilkes cases in England constituted one of the 
landmark events leading to the adoption of the Fourth Amendment.132  
The John Wilkes cases all involved civil damage suits contesting 
unlawful searches, and not efforts by criminal defendants to exclude 
evidence. 
Second, Professor Amar appropriately emphasizes the connection 
between the Fourth Amendment and the common law trespass doctrine.  
As discussed below, the doctrine of unreasonable searches and seizures 
did not originally operate as a restraint on the government.  Instead, the 
prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures derived from English 
laws that prohibited housebreaking by private parties.133
However, the accuracy of Professor Amar’s observations about Fourth 
Amendment remedies provides little guidance about the extent of Fourth 
Amendment rights.  Civil damages were the remedy for Fourth 
Amendment violations.  However, this observation simply does not 
establish that the framers sought to limit the use of warrants.134  As 
discussed above, the presence of a warrant requirement in many 
statutory enactments suggests just the opposite.135
Nor does the civil damages remedy demonstrate that the Fourth 
Amendment imposed some global reasonableness requirement on all 
searches and seizures.  If Professor Amar could cite framing-era Fourth 
Amendment civil damage suits brought in cases not involving house 
searches, this certainly would support Professor Amar’s global 
reasonableness requirement.  But Professor Amar cannot cite such cases, 
because they do not exist.  In describing unlawful search cases from 
eighteenth-century England, Professor Amar accurately observes: “John 
Wilkes and company, after all, had recovered a King’s ransom from civil 
juries to teach arrogant officialdom a lesson and to deter future 
abuse.”136  But in the John Wilkes cases, damages were awarded for 
 132. See infra text accompanying notes 159–69. 
 133. See infra text accompanying notes 142–45. 
 134. See Cloud, supra note 86, at 1730 (asserting that although warrants did provide 
a defense in trespass suits, “to extrapolate from this narrow fact the broad principle that 
warrants served no protective function is simply to ignore the development of specific 
warrants”). 
 135. See supra text accompanying notes 84–92. 
 136. Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, supra note 2, at 797.  Nelson 
Lasson observes that in the John Wilkes cases, the English government’s expenses “were 
said to total £100,000.”  LASSON, supra note 99, at 44-45. 




unlawful house searches.  The John Wilkes cases did not establish that 
the concept of unreasonable searches and seizures extended beyond 
house searches. 
Ultimately, Professor Amar seems to read the Fourth Amendment as 
similar to the Fifth Amendment takings clause, which provides that the 
government cannot take private property “for public use, without just 
compensation.”137  Professor Amar’s approach suggests that the framers 
were willing to tolerate unreasonable searches and seizures, as long as 
the search victims ultimately were compensated by civil jury verdicts. 
But such an approach is inconsistent with the unconditional 
denunciations of unreasonable searches that appear during the framing 
era.  In the English case of Wilkes v. Wood,138 Chief Justice Pratt wrote 
that the government’s assertion of a right “to force persons houses, break 
open escrutores, seize their papers, . . . upon a general warrant” would be 
“totally subversive of the liberty of the subject.”139  Similarly, Judge 
William Henry Drayton of Charleston, South Carolina complained in 
1774 that “a petty officer has power to cause the doors and locks of any 
man to be broke open, to enter his most private cabinet, and thence to 
take and carry away, whatever he shall in his pleasure deem uncustomed 
goods.”140  Such statements did not simply request compensation for 
victims of unlawful house searches.  These statements indicated that 
unlawful house searches were categorically unacceptable. 
D.  Summary 
Professor Amar contends that the framers sought to limit the use of 
warrants, that the Fourth Amendment imposed a global reasonableness 
requirement on all searches and seizures, and that the framers envisioned 
a civil damages suit as the appropriate Fourth Amendment remedy.  Of 
these contentions, only Professor Amar’s claim about the civil damages 
remedy is supported by framing-era sources.  Although Professor Amar 
contends that the framers sought to limit the use of warrants, these same 
framers enacted statutes that required specific warrants.  And Professor 
Amar cannot point to any direct evidence supporting a global 
reasonableness requirement.  Instead, all of the evidence suggests that 
the Fourth Amendment did not apply outside of house searches. 
 137. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 138. 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (K.B. 1763). 
 139. Id. at 498. 
 140. William Henry Drayton, A Letter From Freeman, in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 
OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 11, 15 (R.W. Gibbes ed. 1855) [hereinafter 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION]. 
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V.  THE REAL FOURTH AMENDMENT 
Professor Amar’s reading of the Fourth Amendment receives little 
support from historical sources.  However, the mainstream warrant 
preference rule also is inconsistent with Fourth Amendment history.  
During the eighteenth century and the early nineteenth century, 
warrantless searches and seizures took place far more frequently than 
searches pursuant to a warrant.  These searches or seizures rarely were 
challenged on constitutional grounds.  And court decisions invalidating a 
warrantless search or seizure were virtually nonexistent. 
A review of historical sources clearly indicates that the framers who 
enacted the Fourth Amendment intended to address only a narrow, 
specific problem.  The framers intended to proscribe only unlawful 
physical entries into residences—pursuant to either a general warrant, or 
no warrant at all.  In the Fourth Amendment, the framers sought to 
require that government agents obtain a specific warrant before entering 
a house. 
Eighteenth-century and early nineteenth-century discussions of 
unreasonable searches and seizures focus almost exclusively on house 
searches.141  At the same time, any problems raised by searches and 
seizures other than house searches rarely were mentioned. 
In the Fourth Amendment proscription against unreasonable searches 
and seizures of “persons, houses, papers, and effects,” the framers 
sought to proscribe unreasonable searches and seizures of “persons, 
papers, and effects” in a house.  And that is all the framers intended to 
proscribe. 
A. The Origins 
The doctrine prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures did not 
originate as a restraint upon the government.  The Fourth Amendment 
proscription against unreasonable searches originated with English laws 
that protected homes against breaking and entering by private citizens.  
From the beginning, the doctrine of unreasonable searches and seizures 
 141. Professor Amar acknowledges that the framers of the Fourth Amendment were 
particularly concerned with regulating house searches.  See AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, 
supra note 2, at 67 (noting that the Fourth Amendment “singles out ‘houses’ for special 
mention above and beyond other buildings subsumed within the catchall word effects”).  
But unlike this Article, Professor Amar also contends that the Fourth Amendment 
extends beyond house searches.  See supra text accompanying notes 48–57, 93–126. 




was intimately tied to unlawful entries of residences. 
As William Cuddihy observes, as early as the seventh century, English 
codes “penalized severely those who invaded a neighbor’s premises or 
provoked a disturbance within it.”142  Cuddihy writes that the early 
English housebreaking proscriptions acted exclusively as sanctions 
against private persons, and not as restraints on the government.143  The 
English housebreaking laws “sought to control violence by private 
persons toward each other, not official searches by the government . . . .”144
With the increased frequency of government house searches after 
1485, English thought began to postulate that certain types of house 
searches by government agents were unreasonable and unlawful.  As 
Cuddihy summarizes this movement: “Elizabethan Englishmen began to 
insist that their houses were castles for the paradoxical reason that the 
castle-like security that those houses had afforded from intrusion was 
vanishing.  As the violence and frequency of searches escalated, the 
perception that some types of search and seizure were unreasonable 
appeared.”145  From the beginning, the doctrine of unreasonable searches 
and seizures focused on house searches, and not other types of 
government conduct. 
B.  The Commentators 
In their discussion of unreasonable searches and seizures, English and 
early American commentators focused almost exclusively on unlawful 
physical entries of houses.  In 1644, Sir Edward Coke described 
unreasonable searches in the following terms: “One or more justice or 
justices of peace cannot make a warrant upon a bare surmise to break 
open any man’s house to search for a felon, or for stolen goods . . . .”146  
Coke continued that “for justices of peace to make warrants upon 
surmises, for breaking the houses of any subjects to search for felons, or 
stolen goods, is against the Magna Carta.”147
In his 1721 treatise, Matthew Hale expanded on Coke’s rejection of 
 142. Cuddihy, supra note 5, at 32. 
 143. Id. at 36. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 128. 
 146. EDWARD COKE, THE FOURTH PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND 176 (1797, reprinted by William S. Hein & Co. 1986).  Coke’s treatise 
originally was published in 1644.  See Davies, supra note 83, at 578 n.74. 
 147. COKE, supra note 146, at 176.  William Blackstone also emphasized the 
illegality of general warrants.  Blackstone wrote: “A general warrant to apprehend all 
persons suspected, without naming or particularly describing any person in special, is 
illegal and void for it’s [sic] uncertainty . . . .”  4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 
ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: A FACSIMILE OF THE FIRST EDITION OF 1765–1769, at 288 
(Univ. of Chi. Press 1769). 
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general warrants as a justification “to break open any man’s house.”148  
Like other contemporary commentators, Hale focused on house 
searches.  In his chapter Concerning Warrants to Search for Stolen 
Goods, and Seizing of Them,149 Hale wrote exclusively about searches of 
houses, and did not discuss searches of commercial establishments that 
also might contain stolen goods.150
Early American legal commentators seemed to agree that the Fourth 
Amendment merely incorporated the English common law prohibition 
on unlawful physical searches of houses.  In his Commentaries on the 
Constitution of the United States, Joseph Story devoted just one page to 
the Fourth Amendment.  With respect to the amendment, Story wrote: 
“It is little more than the affirmance of a great constitutional doctrine of 
the common law.”151
In discussing this “common law” doctrine, Story referred to the 
English prohibition on general warrants.  After describing the general 
warrant, Story wrote: “In the year 1763, the legality of these general 
warrants was brought before the King’s Bench [in England] for solemn 
decision; and they were adjudged to be illegal, and void for 
uncertainty.”152  Story continued that a legal warrant “must not only state 
the name of the party, but also the time, and place, and nature of the 
offence with reasonable certainty.”153
Story’s brief treatment of the Fourth Amendment is perfectly 
consistent with a limited amendment, which only regulated house searches.  
However, if the Fourth Amendment imposed a global reasonableness 
requirement on a broad array of government conduct, Story’s brief 
treatment of the amendment is difficult to explain. 
As noted above, Thomas Cooley’s account of the Fourth 
Amendment is entirely consistent with the views of other early 
 148. See 2 HALE, supra note 78, at 149 (quoting COKE, supra note 146, at 176). 
 149. Id. 
 150. See, e.g., id. at 151 (concluding that if an officer possesses a specific warrant 
and “stolen goods be in the house, the officer may break open the door”); id. (observing 
that where an officer lawfully enters a house to search for stolen goods and no stolen 
goods are in the house, the party “that made the suggestion [about the presence of stolen 
goods] is punishable in such case . . .”). 
 151. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 
1005, at 709 (Carolina Academic Press 1987) (1833). 
 152. Id. at 710.  Story was referring to the John Wilkes cases, which concluded that 
English house searches conducted pursuant to a general warrant had violated common 
law principles.  See infra text accompanying notes 159–69. 
 153. STORY, supra note 151, at 710. 




commentators, who explicitly referred to house searches when 
discussing unreasonable searches and seizures.154  In describing the 
Fourth Amendment, Cooley wrote: “The maxim that ‘every man’s 
house is his castle’ is made a part of our constitutional law in the 
clause prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .”155
The Continental Congress provides one of the best sources of 
information on the framers’ intent when they proscribed unreasonable 
searches and seizures in the Fourth Amendment.  In their complaint 
against oppressive British action, the Congress focused on house 
searches, and not other law enforcement activity.  As William Cuddihy 
reports, in a 1774 address to the American people, the Continental 
Congress protested against the power of customs officers “to break open 
and enter houses without the authority of any civil magistrate founded 
on legal information.”156  In a 1774 letter to the inhabitants of Quebec, 
the Congress warned that British customs officers would break into 
“houses, the scenes of domestic peace and comfort and called the castles 
of the English subjects in the books of their law.”157
During the framing era, English and American commentators 
demonstrated a remarkable uniformity about what constituted unreasonable 
searches and seizures.  Early commentators all focused on the need to 
proscribe unlawful house searches.  Nothing in these early commentaries 
supports the global reasonableness requirement asserted by Professor 
Amar. 
C.  The Controversies 
Commentators have observed that discussions of unreasonable 
searches in the late eighteenth century primarily focused on three 
controversies—the John Wilkes cases in England, Paxton’s case in 
Boston, and American reactions to the Townshend Act.158  In all three 
controversies, criticisms of the English government focused almost 
exclusively on physical searches of houses pursuant to general warrants. 
 154. See supra text accompanying notes 116–25 (discussing Justice Cooley’s 
opinion in Weimer v. Bunbury). 
 155. COOLEY, supra note 122, at 299–300. 
 156. Cuddihy, supra note 5, at 1116. 
 157. Id. at 1117. 
 158. See, e.g., LASSON, supra note 99, at 43–47 (discussing the John Wilkes cases), 
57–63 (discussing Paxton’s case), 69–76 (discussing the Townshend Act); see also 
Davies, supra note 83, at 561–67 (discussing these three controversies, and noting 
agreement among commentators that these controversies represent the most important 
events leading to the adoption of the Fourth Amendment). 
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1.  The John Wilkes Cases 
In the eighteenth century, the most well-known examples of 
unreasonable searches arose out of an English seditious libel prosecution, 
brought against opposition politician John Wilkes and his supporters.159  
In April 1763, an anonymous letter printed in an opposition periodical 
described the British Tory administration as “‘wretched’ puppets,” and 
“the tools of corruption and despotism.”160  Based on a single general 
warrant issued by the Tory Secretary of State, English officers searched 
at least five houses and arrested at least forty-nine people.161  Wilkes and 
his supporters responded with at least thirty different trespass and false 
imprisonment suits.162
In a series of decisions issued between 1763 and 1769, English courts 
concluded that the house searches in the John Wilkes cases violated 
English common law principles.163  The officers who conducted these 
house searches were liable for trespass and false imprisonment.164
Professor Amar acknowledges the importance of the John Wilkes 
cases in the development of thought on unreasonable searches and 
seizures.165  However, Professor Amar does not recognize the extent to 
which these decisions focused on the impropriety of house searches. 
For example, in Huckle v. Money,166 Chief Justice Pratt refused to set 
aside a damages verdict won by a printer, whose house had been 
searched pursuant to the general warrant.  Chief Justice Pratt’s opinion 
harshly criticized house searches pursuant to general warrants.  For 
example, Chief Justice Pratt wrote: “To enter a man’s house by virtue of 
a nameless warrant, in order to procure evidence, is worse than the 
 159. For a detailed account of the John Wilkes cases, see Cuddihy, supra note 5, at 
886–927. 
 160. Id. at 886. 
 161. Id. at 893. 
 162. Id. at 894. 
 163. The published opinions that arose out of suits initiated by John Wilkes and his 
followers include Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (K.B. 1763); Money v. Leach, 97 
Eng. Rep. 1050 (K.B. 1765); Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765); and 
Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (K.B. 1763). 
 164. See LASSON, supra note 99, at 44–45 (describing the verdicts in the John 
Wilkes cases, and noting that the English government’s expenses in these cases “were 
said to total £100,000”). 
 165. See, e.g., Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, supra note 2, at 772, 
797–98; Amar, The Writs of Assistance, supra note 2, at 65 (stating that the John Wilkes 
cases were “the most famous colonial-era cases in all America”). 
 166. Huckle, 95 Eng. Rep. at 768. 




Spanish Inquisition; a law under which no Englishman would wish to 
live an hour; it was a most daring public attack made upon the liberty of 
the subject.”167  Other opinions issued in the John Wilkes cases included 
similar criticisms of unlawful house searches.168
The John Wilkes cases focused exclusively on the impropriety of 
house searches pursuant to a general warrant.  These cases did not 
suggest that similar searches of shops, warehouses, or vessels  would 
violate common law principles.169  Nor did these cases announce the 
global reasonableness requirement that Professor Amar infers from 
Fourth Amendment history. 
2.  Paxton’s Case 
Charles Paxton was a Boston, Massachusetts customs officer.  In 
1761, Paxton sought to renew a writ of assistance that he had received 
from the Superior Court in Boston.170  The writ of assistance was the 
American equivalent of the English general warrant.171
In January 1761, an association of Massachusetts merchants challenged 
Paxton’s writ of assistance before the superior court.  James Otis, a 
prominent Boston attorney, argued the case on behalf of the merchants.172
Otis argued that the writs of assistance operated as general warrants, 
in violation of common law principles.  Otis initially asserted that “the 
freedom of one’s house” was among “the most essential branches of 
English liberty.”173  Otis then complained that with a writ of assistance, 
 167. Id. at 769. 
 168. See, e.g., Entick, 95 Eng. Rep. at 818 (concluding that “to enter a man’s house, 
search for and take away all his books and papers” violated common law principles); 
Wilkes, 98 Eng. Rep. at 498 (asserting that where the defendants claimed a right “to force 
persons houses, break open escrutores, seize their papers, . . . upon a general warrant,” 
these actions were “totally subversive of the liberty of the subject”). 
 169. Eighteenth-century Americans may have lacked access to the actual opinions 
issued in the John Wilkes cases.  See Davies, supra note 83, at 565 n.25 (noting that the 
official reports of the John Wilkes cases “were not published contemporaneously with 
the trials”).  But during the eighteenth century, these opinions were reported widely in 
the popular press—both in America and in England.  See, e.g., Cuddihy, supra note 5, at 
927–37 (describing British publications that opposed the use of general warrants in the 
John Wilkes cases); Davies, supra note 83, at 563 (describing British and colonial 
newspaper accounts of the John Wilkes cases, which emphasized “the sanctity of the 
house while condemning general warrants”); see also JACOB W. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH 
AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 29 (1966) (noting Chief Justice Pratt’s popularity 
in England, following his opinions in the John Wilkes cases). 
 170. Cuddihy, supra note 5, at 760–61. 
 171. Colonial authorities used the writs of assistance to search for customs 
violations.  The writs authorized customs officers to search any places where the officers 
suspected that smuggled goods were hidden.  Customs officers believed that these writs 
empowered them to enter and inspect all houses in Massachusetts.  Id. at 759. 
 172. Cuddihy, supra note 5, at 765. 
 173. SMITH, supra note 79, at 344. 
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customs officials “may enter our houses when they please . . . may break 
locks, bars and every thing in their way—and whether they break 
through malice or revenge, no man, no court, can inquire . . . .”174
On November 18, 1761, the Superior Court in Boston ultimately 
approved the continued use of the writs of assistance.175  Nonetheless, 
Otis’s argument was one of the major events that fueled the movement 
for American independence from England.176
It is significant that Otis argued only against house searches.  As 
Thomas Davies has noted, Otis’s clients were “merchants who also 
owned ships and warehouses.”177  But Otis did not challenge the searches 
of warehouses or the seizure of ships—only physical intrusions into 
residences.178
3.  American Opposition to the Townshend Act 
In 1767, the British Parliament enacted the Townshend Act.  The act 
reauthorized the use of writs of assistance by custom officers in 
America.179  But given the profound influence of the John Wilkes cases 
and Paxton’s case, colonial courts rarely issued the writs, and customs 
officers could not execute the writs effectively.180
Like the John Wilkes cases and Paxton’s case, opposition to the 
 174. Id. 
 175. Cuddihy, supra note 5, at 798. 
 176. For John Adams’s description of the argument made by Otis, see 10 THE 
WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 247–48 (1856).  See 
also Davies, supra note 83, at 561–62 n.20 (concluding that “Otis’s argument was widely 
known in Boston,” but expressing uncertainty about whether news of the case reached 
beyond Massachusetts). 
 177. Davies, supra note 83, at 602. 
 178. Id. at 601–02. 
 179. Cuddihy, supra note 5, at 1040. 
 180. As William Cuddihy describes the implementation of the Townshend Act: “In 
only a few colonies did the courts issue the writs as general search warrants, and the 
massive searches that those writs authorized were never implemented on an effective 
scale.”  Id. at 1046.  Cuddihy identifies at least three different reactions to the 
Townshend Act.  In Massachusetts, judges actually issued the writs of assistance.  
However, as a result of popular resistance, customs officers usually were not able to 
execute effective searches pursuant to the writs.  Id. at 1046–49.  In colonies such as 
Rhode Island, Maryland, and South Carolina, judges either ignored the writ applications, 
or repeatedly postponed considering these applications.  Id. at 1056–57.  The Supreme 
Courts of Pennsylvania and Connecticut attempted to transform the writs into specific 
search warrants.  Id. at 1067; see also LASSON, supra note 99, at 73 (reporting that most 
colonial courts “refused to grant general writs of assistance even after the Townshend 
Act had set at rest all technical objections to their legality”). 




Townshend Act again focused on the use of general warrants to 
authorize house searches.  When he attacked the writs of assistance in 
1772, Samuel Adams asserted: “[O]ur homes and even our bed 
chambers, are exposed to be ransacked, our boxes chests & trunks broke 
open ravaged and plundered by wretches . . . whenever they are pleased 
to say they suspect there are in the house wares etc. for which the dutys 
have not been paid.”181  Adams continued that customs officers may 
“break thro’ the sacred rights of the Domicil, [and] ransack mens 
houses . . . .”182  Similarly, Judge William Henry Drayton of Charleston 
complained in 1774 that “a petty officer has power to cause the doors 
and locks of any man to be broke open, to enter his most private cabinet, 
and thence to take and carry away, whatever he shall in his pleasure 
deem uncustomed goods.”183
After the Revolutionary War, the reactions of early state legislatures to 
general warrants also are instructive.  As discussed above, in the 1780s, 
both Massachusetts and Pennsylvania passed laws that mandated 
specific warrants.184  However, these statutes required specific warrants 
only for house searches—not for searches of other places.185
4.  The Ship Seizure Cases 
The only significant pre-Revolutionary American challenges to 
nonresidential searches or seizures arose out of the British seizure of 
American ships, based on allegations of customs violations.  In two 
particularly notorious cases, British agents seized ships owned by 
prominent merchants Henry Laurens of South Carolina and John 
Hancock of Massachusetts.186  Nelson Lasson observes that in Boston 
during 1768, “a riot resulted when John Hancock’s sloop ‘Liberty’ was 
seized . . . .”187
 181. A State of the Rights of the Colonists, supra note 81, at 243 (report typically 
attributed to Samuel Adams). 
 182. Id. at 244.  Like James Otis, Adams made his argument in the seaport of 
Boston.  Many members of Adams’s audience undoubtedly were merchants, who owned 
shops, warehouses, and vessels.  Nonetheless, Adams only discussed house searches. 
 183. DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, supra note 140, at 
15. 
 184. See supra text accompanying notes 86–91. 
 185. Id.  Admittedly, some early state statutes required that law enforcement 
officers obtain specific warrants before undertaking searches outside of the home.  For 
example, a 1786 Rhode Island statute required that federal tax agents must obtain a 
specific warrant before the agents could search a “Dwelling-House, Store, Ware-house, 
or other Building.”  Cuddihy, supra note 5, at 1292.  In a 1786 act, Delaware required 
that government agents must obtain specific warrants before the agents could search 
buildings for cargo pilfered from shipwrecked vessels.  Id. at 1293. 
 186. See Cuddihy, supra note 5, at 1205–14. 
 187. LASSON, supra note 99, at 72.  Some authors have cited these ship seizure 
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However, nineteenth-century cases strongly indicate that the framers 
did not intend to apply the Fourth Amendment to ship seizures.  As 
discussed above, during the early nineteenth century, federal authorities 
regularly seized ships, sometimes with minimal evidentiary support.188  
But neither the attorneys arguing these cases nor the Justices who 
decided the cases even mentioned the Fourth Amendment. 
Without question, American colonial merchants deplored British 
seizures of American ships.  However, Americans also apparently did 
not view the Fourth Amendment as the means for regulating these ship 
seizures.  In the 1789 Collections Act, Congress approved the 
warrantless search of vessels for customs violations.189  Americans 
apparently believed that regulation of ship seizures would occur through 
federal statutes, and not through application of the Fourth Amendment. 
D.  House Searches and the Ambiguity of Fourth Amendment History 
The house search interpretation presented above is what Professor 
Morgan Cloud describes as a “lawyer’s history.”190  When Professor Cloud 
uses this term, he is referring to the tendency of lawyers writing 
historical analysis to “condense the complexity and ambiguity of life,” 
thus “giving form to history’s chaos by selectively omitting 
details . . . .”191  The development of the doctrine of unreasonable 
searches and seizures was too complicated, and too chaotic, for all of the 
evidence to fit in a simple, neat package. 
In his review of William Cuddihy’s landmark dissertation on the 
Fourth Amendment, Professor Cloud writes: “With almost humorous 
regularity, Cuddihy documents how victims and critics of general 
searches and seizures complained bitterly and loudly, only to use the 
cases as indicating that the framers intended to extend the Fourth Amendment beyond 
house searches.  See Maclin, supra note 5, at 962 (stating that the ship seizure 
controversies “helped to focus colonial thinking on the principle of probable cause”).  
But cf. Davies, supra note 83, at 604.  Davies contends that the ship seizure controversies 
did not dispute “general search authority,” but instead involved challenges focused on 
“‘customs racketeering’ in the form of hypertechnical applications of customs rules or 
forfeiture proceedings based on perjured testimony from informers.”  Id. 
 188. See supra text accompanying notes 108–115. 
 189. Collections Act of 1789, § 24, 1 Stat. 29, 43 (1789).  Based on this provision, 
Chief Justice William Howard Taft concluded that the Fourth Amendment was intended 
to apply to ship searches.  See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 150–51 (1925). 
 190. Cloud, supra note 86, at 1707–08. 
 191. Id. at 1709. 




same methods against their adversaries when they had the chance.”192  
For example, the invalidity of house searches pursuant to general 
warrants formed the most persistent theme in early American complaints 
about unreasonable searches and seizures.  But as of 1787, five states 
still permitted the use of general warrants.193  In the framing era, the 
term “unreasonable search and seizure” sometimes meant different 
things, to different people in different places. 
Given the complexity of the historical record, some historical 
fragments inevitably will conflict with the house search interpretation of 
the Fourth Amendment advocated in this essay.  For example, some 
early state statutes required warrants for non-residential searches.  For 
example, one section of the 1789 Collections Act required a specific 
warrant before federal customs officers could search buildings.194  A 
1786 Rhode Island statute permitted a federal tax agent to search houses, 
stores, warehouses, or other buildings only after the agent had obtained a 
specific warrant.195  A 1786 Delaware statute required that before a law 
enforcement agent could search any buildings for goods pilfered from 
shipwrecks, the agent must obtain a warrant.196
Second, warrantless searches of houses sometimes may have been 
permitted.  As Professor Amar notes, an early federal statute authorized 
warrantless entries into all “houses, store-houses, ware-houses, buildings 
and places” that had been registered for storing or distilling liquor.197  
Although this statute explicitly used the word “houses,” the statute 
probably was intended to cover only commercial premises used to distill 
and store liquor.198  Professor Amar acknowledges that the “houses” 
covered by the statute were “‘houses”‘ of sorts—though obviously 
deserving of less privacy than a purely private abode.”199
Despite these examples, the house search interpretation of the Fourth 
Amendment remains the most plausible reading of the amendment’s 
history.  According to the mainstream warrant preference rule, the 
Fourth Amendment always prefers and sometimes mandates warrants.200  
 192. Id. at 1717. 
 193. Id. at 1727–28. 
 194. Collections Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 29, 43 (1789); see also Maclin, supra note 5, 
at 963 (discussing the collections act). 
 195. Cuddihy, supra note 5, at 1292. 
 196. Id. at 1293. 
 197. Act of March 3, 1791, ch. 15, §§ 25, 29, 1 Stat. 199, 205–06. 
 198. See Davies supra note 83, at 712 (asserting that when Congress enacted this 
statute, the legislators understood that they “had leeway to confer general search 
authority on revenue officers regarding commercial premises—though not for places 
actually used as dwellings”). 
 199. Amar, Terry and Fourth Amendment First Principles, supra note 2, at 1105. 
 200. See supra text accompanying notes 5–7 (describing the warrant preference 
rule). 
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However, the warrant preference rule receives little support from early 
American practice, where the government conducted most searches and 
seizures without a warrant.201
Nor does Professor Amar’s alternative account receive substantial 
support from historical sources.  According to Professor Amar, the 
framers believed that warrants were dangerous.  However, a number of 
early federal and state statutes mandated specific warrants, raising severe 
doubts about the accuracy of Professor Amar’s contention.202
And although Professor Amar asserts that the Fourth Amendment 
imposed a general reasonableness requirement on searches and seizures, 
court opinions prior to the 1880s almost never mentioned the 
amendment.203  In the rare nineteenth-century cases where attorneys 
demonstrated the creativity to raise a Fourth Amendment argument, such 
arguments were quickly dismissed.204  If the Fourth Amendment did 
impose some general reasonableness requirement, this would have been 
news to early American judges and attorneys. 
The evolution of the doctrine of unreasonable searches and seizures 
was complex and chaotic.  But in the end, the vast weight of the 
historical evidence indicates that when the framers enacted the Fourth 
Amendment, they only intended to regulate house searches.  While not 
all of the evidence is consistent with this house search interpretation, this 
reading is more plausible than the alternative interpretations of Fourth 
Amendment history. 
E.  Summary 
A review of the historical evidence indicates that when the framers 
adopted the Fourth Amendment, they intended to implement a provision 
that was much narrower than modern mainstream conceptions of the 
amendment, or the historical interpretation advanced by Professor 
Amar.205  The John Wilkes cases, Paxton’s case, and American opposition 
 201. See Bradley, supra note 73, at 1041 (observing that in early America, 
warrantless searches “were the rule rather than the exception”). 
 202. See supra text accompanying notes 84–89. 
 203. See supra text accompanying notes 96–107. 
 204. See supra text accompanying notes 101–07. 
 205. Thomas Davies has advanced a reading of Fourth Amendment history that is 
very similar to the interpretation presented in this Article.  Davies appropriately 
emphasizes that the historical concerns resulting in the Fourth Amendment “were almost 
exclusively about the need to ban house searches under general warrants.”  Davies, supra 
note 83, at 551; see also id. at 642–50 (emphasizing the sanctity of the home in 




to the Townshend Act all focused on a single, narrow issue—the need to 
proscribe house searches pursuant to a general warrant, or no warrant at 
all. 
When they enacted the Fourth Amendment, the framers intended that 
law enforcement agents typically must obtain a specific warrant before 
these agents entered a house.  And that is all that the framers intended.  
The historical record does not provide any evidence that the framers 
intended to impose a global reasonableness requirement on all searches 
and seizures. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
According to the traditional understanding of the Fourth Amendment, 
eighteenth-century America). 
However, I disagree with Davies on at least two points.  Davies concludes that the sole 
purpose of the Fourth Amendment was “banning Congress from authorizing use of 
general warrants . . . .”  Id. at 724.  “In other words, the Framers did not address 
warrantless intrusions at all in the Fourth Amendment or in the earlier state 
provisions . . . .”  Id. at 551. 
In concluding that the Fourth Amendment did not address warrantless searches, Davies 
notes the absence of eighteenth-century protests about warrantless house searches.  Id. at 
603.  However, the lack of debate about warrantless house searches likely occurred 
because in early America, “the common law apparently provided no justification for a 
search of a house beyond the ministerial execution of a valid search warrant.”  Id. at 649.  
In other words, everyone agreed that warrantless house searches were impermissible. 
According to Davies’s reading of the framers’ intent, a search of a house pursuant to a 
general warrant would be an “unreasonable search,” as that term is used in the Fourth 
Amendment.  However, Davies asserts that a warrantless house search would not be an 
unreasonable search, at least for Fourth Amendment purposes.  Given the profound 
common law tradition that proscribed unauthorized entries into houses, I cannot agree 
with Davies’s conclusion that the Fourth Amendment did not proscribe warrantless 
house searches. 
Davies and I also disagree on the implications of the framers’ original intent for 
current Fourth Amendment doctrine.  Davies believes that a return to the original 
understanding of the Fourth Amendment “would subvert the purpose the Framers had in 
mind when they adopted the text.”  Id. at 741.  Davies largely accepts the Supreme 
Court’s rewriting of the Fourth Amendment, because law enforcement officers today 
exercise “a level of discretionary authority that the Framers would not have expected a 
warrantless officer could exercise unless general warrants had been made legal.”  Id. 
I agree with Davies that unrestrained police discretion is undesirable.  However, 
judicial activism is not the only potential source for police restraint.  Police discretion 
could be constrained by elected officials who supervise police departments, by statutes, 
or by amendments to state constitutions or the federal constitution. 
In short, having nine appointed Supreme Court Justices re-invent the Fourth 
Amendment based on their personal views about “unreasonable searches and seizures” is 
not the most sensible way to regulate police discretion.  In my opinion, Fourth 
Amendment doctrine is such a mess because well-intentioned judges have invoked the 
amendment in situations where it never was intended to apply.  See supra text 
accompanying notes 5–35 (discussing Fourth Amendment decisions that seem arbitrary 
and incoherent). 
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the amendment prefers searches pursuant to a warrant.  Given the 
prevalence of warrantless searches and seizures during and after the 
enactment of the Fourth Amendment, the traditional warrant preference 
rule seems inconsistent with Fourth Amendment history. 
Professor Akhil Amar has developed a very different interpretation of 
Fourth Amendment history.  According to Professor Amar, the Fourth 
Amendment does not prefer warrants.  Instead, the amendment was 
designed to limit the use of warrants.  In addition, Professor Amar asserts 
that the Fourth Amendment imposed a global reasonableness requirement 
on all government searches and seizures. 
Professor Amar’s approach receives even less support from historical 
sources than the traditional warrant preference rule.  Contrary to 
Professor Amar’s claims, the framers did not seek to limit the use of 
specific warrants.  And the historical evidence does not support 
Professor Amar’s contention that the framers intended to impose a 
global reasonableness requirement on all government searches and 
seizures. 
The historical record actually supports a third interpretation of the 
Fourth Amendment, different from both the warrant preference rule and 
Professor Amar’s reasonableness approach.  Specifically, the framers 
enacted the amendment solely to regulate house searches.  The Fourth 
Amendment required that law enforcement officers typically must obtain 
a specific warrant before the officers entered a house.  The amendment 
proscribed house searches pursuant to a general warrant, or no warrant at 
all.  And house searches were the only thing that the amendment was 
intended to regulate. 
With a broad Fourth Amendment, Supreme Court Justices and law 
professors have become important figures in the regulation of law 
enforcement.  So it is unsurprising that both groups have advocated 
broad readings of the amendment. 
But the incoherence of modern Fourth Amendment doctrine also is 
unsurprising, given the lack of connection between modern readings of 
the amendment and the intent of the amendment’s framers.  Fourth 
Amendment doctrine is such a mess precisely because lawyers and 
judges have invoked the amendment in situations where it never was 
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